Japanese history from 1919 to 1941

Satsuma domain

Officially Kagoshima prefecture

The battle of Toba-fushimi between Chosha, satsuma ( pro imperial) and the Tokugawa shoganate forces. In January 1868, a year which marked the end of Fuudalisim in Japan and allowed the Emporor to make a formal declaration of his centralised power.

The Grand Stratagy of Japan from 1919 until 1941.

This document rests upon a well presented you tube video to which, expansion to, is my domain. In the original video two questions were offered;

• Why did Japan choose military solutions to solve strategic problems?
• Why were those solutions directed towards America?

After World war 1, where Japan had fought the first Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in London 30^th January 1902 Lord landsdown and Hayashi Tadasu “ Tripartite intervention”. The Triple intervention was an intervention by Russia, Germany, and France over the terms of the treaty of Shimonoseki . Signed between Japan and the Qing dynasty of China that ended the first Sino-Japanese war. . The terms were renewed in 1905 and 1911. This prompted British suspicions about Japans intent in the South Asia region.

The alliance provisions for “mutual defense” prompted Japan to enter the first World War on the British side.

By 1918 the three big powers ( China Russia and Germany) had collapsed and into this Vacuum stepped the Japanese with anti communist intervention in eastern Siberia

I want to step back and interject with this thought that will shine a light on the thinking in and around this time.

Remember that oil had started to be recognized as the “energy” of the future. Interested parties whom may have large access to oil and be struggling to find outlets for, resorting to selling it as a “cancer cure “ with the addition of a laxative.

This move towards a “energy based economy” saw Japan on the back foot with little or no natural resources of its own.

World War one had shown that “war” would be “total” in nature and would require a large economy backed by energy. As Nathan Bedford Forrest, a Confederate Army general during the American Civil War said “ Winning means getting there first-est with the most-est”. Note that while being a good General , old Nathan was very much a product of his time.

Three schools of thought sprung up in Japan during this period.

Three Grand Strategic Responses of Japan

• Internationalists;; Shidehara Kujiro and Kato Tomosaburo

The future of war would be “total” and Japan “lacked” resourses so could not win by itself alone. So the political status quo would align themselves with a negotiated political order and example of which would be the tripple alliance with Europe 1914.

• Traditional; Araki Sadao and Osumi Mineo.

The traditional response argued that Japan could still win a limited war with a large standing army and good “opertunity”. The Russo-Japanese war being an example of this thinking. The Japanese used surprise to defeat the russians at Port Arthur. Then defend nd wear down the opposition and convince them to give upo the land as the “costs” were not worth the small but limited expansion.

• Totalists; Kita Ikki, Ishikawa Kanji and Kishi Nobosuki.

Anti-establishment groups later to be impressed by Germanys reconstruction wanted “unity” between the people but with state controlled society ( which is collectivism )to re-enforce unity with the “ national consciousness”. They also wanted to abolish or limit aristrocratic parties, big business and libertarianism.

“ The weak are meat and the strong eat” Jakuniku Kyoshoku

External expansion,

In order to expand and reform , i.e. to secure Japans status in east Asia, as Britain , Germany and France had also done. Take over territories in order to sure up the home shores. However in my opinion, I dont think that Japan realized how far back into the mists of time. There are marks on stone in Italy showing the extent of territories. Old European families and their “fondi” ( Venician investment groups ) have traditionally had investment areas. Japan being a closed country, in my opinion, failed to recognize the extent and power of these investment fronts.

Japan rationalised its expansion using Marxist ideology, with the idea of the “have’s and Have not’s” the elite and the proletariat on a global scale. Remember, Japans main interests were; to maintain a “superior position” in Asia and to “protect its economy” mostly in china and towards the Russian energy grab.

Throughout Japans post World War 1 recession and resultant austerity measures was the limited military expenditure. Japan had no money. The internationalists adopted or engaged with the “washington confrence” of 1921 to 1922. (Washington Conference, also called Washington Naval Conference, by-name of International Conference On Naval Limitation,)

The pillars of the “Washington order” were ;

• Navel treaty or the “5 power” treaty which placed limits on the tonnage of capital shipping. (Capital ships, defined as warships of more than 10,000 tons displacement or carrying guns with a calibre exceeding 8 inches, basically denoted battleships and aircraft carriers). UK and America 10 ships 525000 tons, Japan 9 ships 315000 tons but American and the british could no longer develop the bases at Singapore , Philippines and Guam.

This left Japan with modern basis in the pacific. So while having fewer ships and lesser tonnage Japan had better strategic locations. If we remember, the traditionalist view point of acquiring land , creating a buffer, though “ good opportunity”.

• Nine power treaty (1922). In return for respecting Chinese territorial interrogatory. Colonial powers , incl japan, had equal economic access to Chinese treaty ports.

The 1920s were the era of “Shidehara diplomacy”.

Shidehara entered the diplomatic service in 1899 and served in Korea, London, Washington, and the Netherlands. As ambassador to the United States in 1919, he argued in vain against U.S. immigration laws discriminating against the Japanese. He was the chief Japanese delegate to the Washington Conference (1921–22), in which the major Pacific powers agreed to a naval disarmament and a series of international agreements that would provide for security in the Pacific. As foreign minister of Japan from 1924 to 1927 and again from 1929 to 1931, Shidehara became known as an advocate of a conciliatory policy toward China and a policy of economic rather than military expansion. Through this policy, the threats from the USSR , China and American Navel tonnage arms race.

However Chinese nationalists were growing in strength. Stalins five year plan was seeing the rise in Russian military and in 1928 Chinese nationalists were iching for confrontation the K.M.T army . Just as an aside the K.M.T army were; The National Revolutionary Army (NRA), sometimes shortened to Revolutionary Army (革命軍) before 1928, and as National Army (國軍) after 1928, was the military arm of the Kuomintang (KMT, or the Chinese Nationalist Party) from 1925 until 1947 in the Republic of China. It also became the regular army of the ROC during the KMT's period of party rule beginning in 1928. It was renamed the Republic of China Armed Forces after the 1947 Constitution, which instituted civilian control of the military.

Originally organized with Soviet aid as a means for the KMT to unify China during the Warlord Era, the National Revolutionary Army fought major engagements in the Northern Expedition against the Chinese Beiyang Army warlords, in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) against the Imperial Japanese Army and in the Chinese Civil War against the People's Liberation Army.

Japan, also, had internal opposition from the “Traditionalists and the Totalists” as well s the navy being concerned about fleet inferiority. As well as a “perceived time pressure” which camefrom the USSRs 5 year plan and increasing Chinese unity with K.M.T clashes with Russia over Manchuria.

So, in 1931 the “Totalists” under Ishikawa Kanji staged a “false flag” event known now as the “Mukeden indecent”. September 31^st sees the Kwantung Army blow up a south Manchurian railway. A bomb was secretly planted on the tracks of the Japanese-controlled Southern Manchuria Railway by Kwantung Army elements. Charging that Chinese soldiers had attacked the rail line, Ishiwara ordered Japanese troops to seize the Chinese military barracks in the nearby city of Liutiaokou. He then ordered Kwantung Army units to seize control of all other Manchurian cities without informing the new commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, General Shigeru Honjo, or the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff in Tokyo. The bomb was not very powerful and no-one was hurt in the incident.

The sudden invasion of Manchuria alarmed political leaders in Japan, and brought condemnation down on the country from the international community. Ishiwara thought it most likely that he would be executed or at least dishonorably discharged for his insubordination. However, the success of the operation brought just the opposite. Ishiwara was admired by “right-wing” younger officers and nationalist societies for his daring and initiative. He returned to Japan and was given command of the IJA 4th Infantry Regiment in Sendai. This totalist move effectively ended the “9 power treaty”. Japan was now perceived as a threat in the area. Ishikawa was promoted to Chief of Army operations in 1933.

Just before we move on I want to look at Ishiwara Kanji. As his name will repeatedly appear as we progress. Ishiwara was born in Tsuruoka City, Yamagata Prefecture, into a samurai class family. His father was a police officer, but as his clan had supported the Tokugawa bakufu and then the Northern Alliance during the Boshin War of the Meiji Restoration, its members were shut out of higher government positions.

Ishiwara spent several years in various staff assignments and then was selected to study in Germany as a military attaché. He stayed in Berlin and in Munich from 1922 to 1925, focusing on military history and military strategy. He hired several former officers from the German General Staff to tutor him, and by the time that he returned to Japan, he had formed a considerable background on military theory and doctrine.

Prior to leaving for Germany, Ishiwara had converted to Nichiren Buddhism. Nichiren had taught that a period of massive conflict would precede a golden era of human culture in which the truth of Buddhism would prevail. Japan would be the center and main promulgator of the faith, which would encompass the entire world. Ishiwara felt that the period of world conflict was fast approaching, and Japan, relying upon its vision of the kokutai and its sacred mission to "liberate" China, would lead a unified East Asia to defeat the West.

Ishiwara was also the leader of a semi-religious and Pan-Asianist organization, the East-Asia League Movement (Tōarenmei undō).

In 1935 Ishiwara Kanji reveals his “Totalist Grand Strategy” of the national defense state which was to prepare for war by expansion and by becoming economically larger and independent. Remember Japan at this time was in ressession, This Necessitated the expansion into Manchuko and in 1932 established this as a state of Japan. Manchuria produced 73% of chinas iron and 33% of chinas trade in steel crops and energy as well as arms. Setting up Machuria as an complementary economy. Japan took Iron, crops and coal from Manchuria and in return, replied with consumer goods, Capita, technology and organistation. Later to be repeated in trade with America. One does have to wonder if there was outside influence with little scope for imagination and creativity pushing a long term agenda. As this “trade” appeared in the early 1970 between America and Japan. Japan, also imported scrap iron from America and “machine tooling. The fund for which came from a downsized military. In 1936 Ishiwara released his “ five year plan”.

It wasnt all plane sailing in Japan, the National defence state implementation plan , had its detractors. In 1936 the plan called for war with the USSR in the mid 1940 and a”total war” to develop from there, using the tatics of surprise , defense and attrition. The “totalists” had opposition from big business , the civilian population – due to no internal reform and austerity . The “traditionalists” , army minister Araki Sadao and the Navy who were worried about maintaning a fleet which required resourses, especially in light of the American escalation.

In 1936 an attempted coup failed. The February 26 Incident (二・二六事件 Niniroku Jiken), also known as the 2-26 Incident, was an attempted coup d'état in the Empire of Japan on 26 February 1936.

A group of young officers of the radical Kōdōha (Imperial Way) faction of the Imperial Japanese Army attempted to purge the government and military leadership of the moderate Tōseiha (Control Faction), their factional rivals and ideological opponents, to establish an ultranationalist military government. The Kōdōha, under the name the Righteous Army, succeeded in occupying Tokyo and assassinating several leading officials, including two former prime ministers, but failed to assassinate Prime Minister Keisuke Okada or secure control of the Imperial Palace. The Kōdōha and their supporters in the army were unable to achieve a change of government due to strong opposition from Tōseiha in the army, the Japanese Imperial family, and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Facing overwhelming opposition as the army moved against them, the rebels surrendered on 29 February.

This gave the “Totalists” the signals they needed to push forward with their plans. Remember that in order to expand and solidify Japans position in Asia japan needed resources. From 1929 ~ 1932 Japan went from 457 tons of scrap iron 35% of which came from America to, in 1937, 2.4 million tons. 73% of which was from America.

Japan, also had a belief in synthetic substitutes as had Germany before them. To achieve independence in petroleum, the Japanese developed a dual approach: they would acquire natural petroleum sources in Southeast Asia and at the same time establish a synthetic fuel industry for the conversion of coal to oil.

Actually, the Japanese had begun research on synthetic fuel in the 1920s, only a few years after other countries, such as Germany and Britain, that lacked sources of natural petroleum. They did excellent laboratory research on the coal hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch conversion processes, but in their haste to construct large synthetic fuel plants they bypassed the intermediated pilot-plant stage and failed to make a successful transition from small- to large-scale production. Unable to synthesize liquid fuels from coal, they instead derived significant quantities from the technologically simpler coal carbonization and shale oil distillation processes. In the last year of World War II, the Japanese attempted to revive their synthetic fuel industry and entered into an agreement with IG Farben for technical assistance. However with Germanys defeat this agreement may have lapsed.

With these constraints in mind and while the western powers were busy in Europe as well as the following percieved pressures a “ hybrid Grand strategy “ emerged from 1937 until 1941. The pecieved pressures were:

• Time , as we have noted before. World war in Europe , the “pace” of allied re-armament. Expected to be complete by 1942 and the B17 deployments in the Philippines. This “time pressure” concluded that even winning a limited war would be impossible.
• Circular reasoning ( traditionalists). If there is an increased threat, Japan must match that threat to keep stability in Asia. However that produced more “build up” from the threats to Japan
• Crisis reform mentality. Especially from the “totalist” faction. In that Japan was to build , to expand while fighting and by 1942 corporations had become partners of the state. Etsusaburō Shiina (椎名 悦三郎 Shiina Etsusaburo, January 16, 1898 – September 30, 1979) was a Foreign Minister of Japan from 1964–66 and played a pivotal role in ensuring peace between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
  Shiina was the first of the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry Officials to join Manchukuo's industrial administration. Manchukuo became a policy test lab for the “Totalists” to gain experience and to “export” successful schemes such as the “ Electric power control law 1937”. the totalist network in Manchukuo were; Tojo Hideki, Kishi Nobusuke, Masuoka Yosuke.

However due to long supply lines etc. Japan exhausted its stockpiles of army equipment and also the restrictions of foreign reserves. Japan could only import to the value of its exports and in July 1938 japan runs out of anti-tank shells and by August of 1938 Army logistics collapse. At home things were worse.

Remember Japan has just clawed its way out of the 1930 to 1932 was possibly Japans severest ressession and the main consequences on the Japanese economy and society were as follows:

• macroeconomic downturn was felt primarily in falling prices and not so much in output contraction (estimated real growth was positive during this period). As prices fell, manufacturers produced even more to maintain earning and keep factories running. But clearly, this behavior would collectively accelerate the oversupply and the deflation. From 1929 to 1931, WPI fell about 30%, agricultural prices fell 40%, and textile prices fell nearly 50%

Around 1931, rural impoverishment became severe. Moreover in 1934, rural communities were hit by famine. Especially in Tohoku (northeastern) Region of Japan, rural poverty generated many undernourished children and some farmers were forced to sell their daughters for prostitution. This rural disaster caused much anger and popular criticism against the government and big businesses.

So, by 1938, Japan was cutting steel and oil imports by 30% , very little oil and a reliance on wind power. More Civilian rationing and austerity and finally the “national mobilization law” , in other words . The draft.

Unfortunately the world doesn't stand still while Japan struggles. War in Europe was at the fore- front of international thinking. Germany was warning Poland about polish aggression on German citizens and America, in 1934 implemented the Vinson-trammel act and in 1939 in response to “Japanese aggression”. The US terminated commercial treaties with Japan opening the way for later embargoes.

Japan was now “ Right Royally Screwed”. To put it mildly. In response Japan introduced “The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity plan” where technocracy ( inc?) and organization coupled with advanced industry would establish a “sphere” . Talks with the Dutch east indies, who were willing to sell oil to Japan ( 53% of requirement ) but with no concessions. The plan also called for expansion into Singapore and the dutch east indies. No escalation with the USA, and deference towards the “axis” alliance.

By August 1940 the Japanese Navy estimated that there was enough oil for one year. The Army, however, thought it had supplies for two years. In June 1941, Germany opened up a second front with Russia. This presented an opportunity to move into Vladivostok , the Kantokuen plan. Unfortunately this triggered in July 1941, the US oil embargo and asset freeze. Japans woe had deepened. On a side note, in the early 1970s , America suffered an energy crisis. When the Arab nations stopped shipments of oil to America for a short period of time.

This sealed the decition, in Japan, to unite under a “Common Grand Strategy” ( Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) which proposed a limited war and expansion into South east Asia. Remember the Russo-Sino War of 1905 attack with the element of surprise, fortify, and dig in!.

• Phase 1; Secure a strategic perimeter of the pacific Islands, Thailand, Nrth Malasia, Philippines.
• Phase 2; Open up a “five” resource area Borneo, New Guinea, Singapore South Burma.
• Phase 3; Completion, Sulawesi, formerly known as Celebes, Sumatra, Java Nrth Burma.

This was to buy for time before launching “total” war with the USA and to establish a defensive line. While the US mobilizes for war, Japan reforms and develops a “National defensive state” to defend to a “stalemate” with equal resources. The plan had a December 1941 launch date.

Sometimes men need to close their eyes and jump off the veranda

of Kiyomizu temple

If you survive your wish will be granted .

Hideki Tojo.(pm)

The Japanese plan ended in disaster at Midway and marked the turning point in the war. Japan was not able to continue the long term war against a larger foe with greater resources.

I want to spend a little time looking at the battle of Midway as this highlights in my opinion the strengths an weaknesses of the Japanese plans in the pacific.

The entry from that trusted source “ Wikipedia” in this case is a good summary of the overall action at Midway, Snip;

The Battle of Midway was a decisive naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that took place between 4 and 7 June 1942, only six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea. The United States Navy under Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, Frank Jack Fletcher, and Raymond A. Spruance defeated an attacking fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Chūichi Nagumo, and Nobutake Kondō near Midway Atoll, inflicting devastating damage on the Japanese fleet that proved irreparable. Military historian John Keegan called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare",[9] while another naval historian, Craig L. Symonds, called it "one of the most consequential naval engagements in world history, ranking alongside Salamis, Trafalgar, and Tsushima, as both tactically decisive and strategically influential."

The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, sought to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War and thus ensure Japanese dominance in the Pacific. Luring the American aircraft carriers into a trap and occupying Midway was part of an overall "barrier" strategy to extend Japan's defensive perimeter, in response to the Doolittle air raid on Tokyo. This operation was also considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii itself.

The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of the American reaction and poor initial dispositions. Most significantly, American cryptographers were able to determine the date and location of the planned attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to prepare its own ambush. Four Japanese and three American aircraft carriers participated in the battle. The four Japanese fleet carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū, part of the six-carrier force that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier—were all sunk, as was the heavy cruiser Mikuma. The U.S. lost the carrier Yorktown and the destroyer Hammann. Also , and quite importantly, The Japanese fleet looking for a navel showdown with numerically inferior US fleet. Had overlooked, or had no knowledge of the 115 land based planes, from the B17s based on Midway and Hawaii to the douglas dive bombers from the Carriers that had “ magically escaped “ from Pearl Harbour.

After Midway and the exhausting attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign, Japan's capacity to replace its losses in material (particularly aircraft carriers) and men (especially well-trained pilots and maintenance crewmen) rapidly became insufficient to cope with mounting casualties, while the United States' massive industrial and training capabilities made losses far easier to replace. The Battle of Midway, along with the Guadalcanal campaign, is widely considered a turning point in the Pacific War.

Nagumo's dilemma, again from “wikipedia”;

In accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers. The dive bombers were as yet unarmed. The torpedo bombers were armed with torpedoes should any American warships be located.[71]

At 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general-purpose bombs for use against land targets. This was a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as of the morning flight leader's recommendation of a second strike. Re-arming had been underway for about 30 minutes when, at 07:40,[72] the delayed scout plane from Tone signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east, but neglected to describe its composition. Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00.[73]

Nagumo quickly reversed his order to re-arm the bombers with general-purpose bombs and demanded that the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 20–40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force. This was one of the carriers from Task Force 16. The other carrier was not sighted.[74]

Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[75] Nagumo's opportunity to hit the American ships[76] was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force. The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea. Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ("spot") their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch.[77]

The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or, in the case of Sōryū, fighters being spotted to augment the combat air patrol.[78] Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 minutes.[79] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament, and likely without fighter escort; indeed, he had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down.[80]

Japanese carrier doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks. Without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 08:20), Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[81] In addition, the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes.[82]

In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 (with Enterprise and Hornet having completed launching by 07:55, but Yorktown not until 09:08), so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier doctrine, he could not have prevented the launch of the American attack.

I have already talked about the Navel and diplomatic codes; The IJN introduced JN-25 as a fleet general purpose system, and within a few months of introduction it was "of first importance in Japanese naval communications". Ultimately, on 31 August 1942, JN-25 absorbed the traffic previously carried on the administrative, intelligence and material codes.

These code systems had been in use before the introduction of JN-25. T

he intelligence code (introduced in 1935 and called I then JN-82) was cracked and found to largely contain reports on USN traffic volumes, and so work on the system was dropped.

The administrative code (introduced on 1 November 1938, called AD then JN-76) was partially readable in 1940, revealing simple things like ship movement reports, a revision of the system on 1 November 1940 made it proof against further cracking. The material code (introduced in 1935 and called MAT then JN-79) was cracked and revealed some information on the IJN building program, like the construction of the Yamato but no details as to size or guns carried. JN-25 was considered "by far the most complex problem to be attacked".

However, the coded traffic was not as up to date as it could have been. Intercepted traffic from the Pacific intercept stations, which in the period just before Pearl Harbor were Corregidor, Guam and Heeia, Oahu, Hawaii was forwarded to the US via the weekly sailing of the Dollar line "President" liners. A small amount of priority traffic could be sent airmail via the Pan Am clippers, which had a small strong box in their hulls.

This meant the unit in Washington received the messages at best around a week after they were intercepted, and only then if sent by air mail. There was also an intercept station at Seattle, which also sent its intercepts by mail, it was only after the start of the Pacific war that the mail was sent on a daily basis from Seattle. It was not until June 1942 that a TWX circuit was available to the west coast. Remember, Pearl Harbour occurred, Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 and the battle of Midway 4 and 7 June 1942. So America could read in “real time” the traffic for Midway but relied on the British for traffic for Pearl Harbour, That traffic wasnt as prompt as it could have been: -

According to Captain Pelletier, who was working in Washington, "Before the war, we in [OP-20-]GZ were not current with Japanese messages. Our traffic came by slow boat from Cavite [Corregidor]. Guam and Hawaii and by the time the additives were stripped, and the messages logged and printed, we were at least two months behind. I was also informed that my job was to recover code groups and not to worry about intelligence per se." [Albert Pelletier, "Cryptography -- Target Japan" "NCVA History Book" (Turner Publishing Co.: Paducah, KY 1996) p. 30.]

It must be noted, of the role of Bletchley park in England from where potential linguists and cryptographers were recruited from the University of Cambridge and the University of Oxford by referral through people like the Revd Martin Charlesworth, A.D. Lindsay, Dr C. P. Snow, and Theodore Chaundy. Candidates were interviewed and approved by a board that included Colonel Tiltman. Successful candidates received a final interview at Bletchley by a senior representative of their section.

Hut 7 was a wartime section of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park tasked with the solution of Japanese naval codes such as JN4, JN11, JN40, and JN-25. The hut was headed by Hugh Foss who reported to Frank Birch, the head of Bletchley's Naval section.

Hut 7 supplied crypt-analysts and linguists to Bletchley’s front line station the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) at Hong Kong, then Singapore, then Anderson Station (Colombo, Ceylon, now Sri Lanka), then Allidina School in Kilindini, Kenya before moving back to Colombo. Bletchley co-operated with the US Navy Code and Signals Section known as OP-20-G in Washington D.C., and with FRUMEL in Melbourne.

Before we conclude, we must turn our attention to the device that was said to “end all wars” the “Atomic Bomb”.

As we have noted , Japan had lacked resources and because of that had expanded into Manchuria. In December 1938 German scientists, Otto Hahn and Fritz Stassmann submitted a paper to “Naturwissenschaften” reporting they had detected the element “Barium” after bombarding Uranium with Neutrons.

Lise Meitner who had left Germany and had been on the “Hahn” team, concluded with her nephew Otto Robert Frisch that what had happened in the “Hahn experiment” was nuclear fission on a small scale . Frisch confirmed the results with his own experiments in the January of 1939.

Physicists around the world immediately realized that “theoretically” chain reactions could be produced which would enable a destructive device of unimaginable proportions. The fact that Germany was leading the way in the field of nuclear research, sent alarm bells ringing through out the world.

Japan had nuclear scientists, who given Japans working relationship with Germany had access to the German ideas. Dr Nishina, a very competent physicist, had co-authored the “Klien-Nishina” formula and in 1931 had set up his own nuclear research lab at the Riken institute for physical and chemical research , in Tokyo.

Dr Nishina had built his first 26 inch “cyclotron” in 1936. They also purchased another cyclotron from the University of California, Berkeley in 1938. At this point, however we had better look at the different styles of uranium enrichment that were available at that time. Other techniques were available but the cyclotron was the leading method at that time.

The Cyclotron, Calutron was an electro-magnetic isotope separation process. Metallic uranium is first vaporized then positively charged ions are accelerated and then deflected by magnetic fields . A Calutron was used to provide some of the U235 used in Little boy.

One of the drawbacks of the Calutron was the consumption of electricity both of which Japan and Germany struggled with.

Japan was at the forefront of nuclear research and rapidly realized that there were better ways of enriching uranium. The army not to be discouraged and issued a report to set up an experimental project at Riken.

The Ni-go project. Its aim was to separate U235 by thermal diffusion and overlooked alternative methods such as electromagnetic , gaseous and centrifugal.

In typical fashion, 1943 the Japanese Navy had begun a research program called the “ F-go” project at the imperial university Kyoto. Head scientist, Bunsaka Arakatsu , who had spent time studying at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge under Rutherford and at the Berlin University under Einstein . Arakatsus team included Hideki Yukawa; a later Nobel prize winner.

Early on the head of the Navy Research institute chemical section “ Kitagawa” requested Arakarsu to carry out work on the separation of U235 short before the end of the war . Arakatsu had produced an “ultra – centrifuge” designed to spin at 60 000rpm. Only the design was completed before the end of the war.

As I have noted earlier Tojo Hideki and Ishiwara Kanji and others spent time in Germany from the 1920s to the 1930s. Unlike Anglo-American relationship there seems to be relatively limited scientific Co-operation between Germany and Japan with Germany wanting to be paid in the early stage s but later, concerned about the future between the two countries and the outcome of the war. The Germans were more willing to transfer technology.

We know shipments took place in converted mine laying submarines because of the German accounts and of the submarines crews found in Japan after the war but more importantly, the surrendering of U234 in May of 1945.

On a side note this capture accelerated the American Nuclear project. Up to this date, the trinity project had focused on a plutonium bomb. Contained within U234 were the “Yellow cakes” and the technology which allowed the American project to switch tack and develop a uranium bomb. Which was later dropped on Hiroshima. The Hiroshima bomb was a Uranium bomb , the Nagasaki bomb was plutonium bomb.

So why would you drop and “untested” uranium bomb on you enemy that was “untested”. If it failed, you have just given your “secret technology “ to your enemy. This then begs the question ; who tested the uranium” bomb. The Germans. Yes the Germans. Why dint they use it? Possibly they had a more effective weapon under development,

Japan seems to have produced blueprints and a bomb , the blueprints surfaced from The Kuroda/Riken design when the widow of the Japanese industrial chemist who had escaped after the war died and the blueprints appeared.

Rumors still persist of the Japanese plans to test a device near Konan ( modern Haheungin ) in north Korea which was later occupied by the Russians after the war. Allowing the Russians access to state of the art Nuclear technology.

The Atomic bomb could have been dropped in an unoccupied area to show the Japanese they had been double crossed by the Germans. ( Martin Borhman and Ig Farbin). Leaflets were dropped proclaiming more bombs were used and hinting of a large stockpile. Nagasaki was just and act of pure evil.