Sunday 19 May 2019

An old tree never lies

A 3620-Year Temperature Record from Fitzroya cupressoides Tree Rings in Southern South America
Antonio Lara1, Ricardo Villalba2
See all authors and affiliations

Science  21 May 1993:
Vol. 260, Issue 5111, pp. 1104-1106
DOI: 10.1126/science.260.5111.1104
Article
Info & Metrics
eLetters
PDF
Abstract
A tree-ring width chronology of alerce trees (Fitzroya cupressoides) from southern Chile was used to produce an annually resolved 3622-year reconstruction of departures from mean summer temperatures (December to March) for southern South America. The longest interval with above-average temperatures was from 80 B.C. to A.D. 160. Long intervals with below-average temperatures were recorded from A.D. 300 to 470 and from A.D. 1490 to 1700. Neither this proxy temperature record nor instrumental data for southern South America for latitudes between 35° and 44°S provide evidence of a warming trend during the last decades of this century that could be related to anthropogenic causes. The data also indicate that alerce is the second longest living tree after the bristlecone pine (Pinus Iongaeva).

Tuesday 7 May 2019

Precautionary principle

The precautionary principle


 is the concept that establishes it is better to avoid or mitigate an action or policy that has the plausible potential, based on scientific analysis, to result in major or irreversible negative consequences to the environment or public even if the consequences of that activity are not conclusively known, with the burden of proof that it is not harmful falling on those proposing the action. It is a major principle of international environmental law and is extended to other areas and jurisdictions as well.
This principle is important in that it allows one to anticipate harm and take appropriate precautions even in the absence of scientific consensus that the action or policy is harmful and what might be the level of harm. As a result, policy makers are able to make discretionary decisions to delay such an action until scientific findings emerge that provide sound evidence that no harm will result. It is analogous to such commonplace aphorisms as “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," “better safe than sorry," “look before you leap," and the ancient medical principle associated with Hippocrates of "First, do no harm."
In some legal systems, as in the law of the European Union, the application of the precautionary principle has been made a statutory requirement. However, a rigid application of this principle also has drawbacks, such as ignoring possible risks associated with not doing the proposed activity or policy, perhaps resulting in banning a technology that brings advantages out of concern for potential negative impacts. Under such a scenario, the cellular phone might not have been permitted until it could be proved not to be a carcinogen. In the case of the pesticide DDT, if the precautionary principle were to be applied universally and narrowly, it would mean that DDT could not even be introduced into regions heavily infected by malaria because of the deleterious potential impacts of DDT on the fauna.
The precautionary principle recognizes a social responsibility to protect the public from exposure to harm, when scientific investigation has found a plausible risk. Its development as part of international law reflects a growing international recognition of the human responsibility to care for the environment and others and to find legal avenues to prevent actions that might cause severe or irreversible consequences to either.

Basic components

Many definitions of the precautionary principle exist, with precaution itself defined as “caution in advance,” “caution practiced in the context of uncertainty," or “informed prudence.” All definitions of the precautionary principle have three major components:
  1. Anticipate harm and take action to minimize potential harm. This is an expression of a need by decision-makers to anticipate harm before it occurs and an obligation, if the level of harm may be high, for action to prevent or minimize such harm.
  2. Onus of proof on proponent. Under the precautionary principle, it is the responsibility of an activity proponent to establish that the proposed activity will not (or is very unlikely to) result in significant harm. This is an implicit reversal of the typical onus of proof, whereby harm needs to be demonstrated.
  3. Absence of scientific certainty not an obstacle. The precautionary principle is activated even when the absence of scientific certainty makes it difficult to predict the likelihood of harm occurring, or the level of harm should it occur. There is an obligation, if the level of harm may be high, for action to prevent or minimize such harm, with the control measures increasing with both the level of possible harm and the degree of uncertainty.
It is important to note that, although this principle operates in the context of scientific uncertainty, it generally is considered by its proponents to be applicable only when, on the basis of the best scientific advice available, there is good reason to believe that harmful effects might occur.

Diverse formulations of the precautionary principle

Rio Declaration.; One of the primary foundations of the precautionary principle, and globally accepted definitions, results from the work of the Rio Conference, or "Earth Summit" in 1992. Principle #15 of the Rio Declaration notes (UNEP 1992):
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
This definition is important for several reasons. First, it explains the idea that scientific uncertainty should not preclude preventative measures to protect the environment. Second, the use of "cost-effective" measures indicates that costs can be considered. This is different from a "no-regrets" approach, which ignores the costs of preventative action.
Note that this definition uses the term “precautionary approach” rather than “precautionary principle,” a not unimportant distinction given the power of law that the term "principle" is sometimes held to convey. (See "Principle" vs. "approach”.)

5G Good coverage from the New Yorker News paper


newyorker.com

The Terrifying Potential of 5G Technology

By Sue HalpernApril 26, 2019




The future of wireless technology holds the promise of total connectivity. But it will also be especially susceptible to cyberattacks and surveillance.




A Huawei engineer checks on cabling during 5G equipment trials in London, in March. Cybersecurity experts have accused Huawei of being a conduit to Chinese intelligence.Photograph by Simon Dawson / Bloomberg / Getty
In January, 2018, Robert Spalding, the senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council, was in his office at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, across the street from the White House, when he saw a breaking-news alert on the Axios Web site. “Scoop,” the headline read, “Trump Team Considers Nationalizing 5G Network.” At the time, Spalding, a brigadier general in the Air Force who previously served as a defense attaché in Beijing, had been in the military for nearly three decades. At the N.S.C., he was studying ways to insure that the next generation of Internet connectivity, what is commonly referred to as 5G, can be made secure from cyberattacks. “I wasn’t looking at this from a policy perspective,” he said. “It was about the physics, about what was possible.” To Spalding’s surprise, the Axios story was based on a leaked early draft of a report he’d been working on for the better part of a year.
Two words explain the difference between our current wireless networks and 5G: speed and latency. 5G—if you believe the hype—is expected to be up to a hundred times faster. (A two-hour movie could be downloaded in less than four seconds.) That speed will reduce, and possibly eliminate, the delay—the latency—between instructing a computer to perform a command and its execution. This, again, if you believe the hype, will lead to a whole new Internet of Things, where everything from toasters to dog collars to dialysis pumps to running shoes will be connected. Remote robotic surgery will be routine, the military will develop hypersonic weapons, and autonomous vehicles will cruise safely along smart highways. The claims are extravagant, and the stakes are high. One estimate projects that 5G will pump twelve trillion dollars into the global economy by 2035, and add twenty-two million new jobs in the United States alone. This 5G world, we are told, will usher in a fourth industrial revolution.
A totally connected world will also be especially susceptible to cyberattacks. Even before the introduction of 5G networks, hackers have breached the control center of a municipal dam system, stopped an Internet-connected car as it travelled down an interstate, and sabotaged home appliances. Ransomware, malware, crypto-jacking, identity theft, and data breaches have become so common that more Americans are afraid of cybercrime than they are of becoming a victim of violent crime. Adding more devices to the online universe is destined to create more opportunities for disruption. “5G is not just for refrigerators,” Spalding said. “It’s farm implements, it’s airplanes, it’s all kinds of different things that can actually kill people or that allow someone to reach into the network and direct those things to do what they want them to do. It’s a completely different threat that we’ve never experienced before.”
Spalding’s solution, he told me, was to build the 5G network from scratch, incorporating cyber defenses into its design. Because this would be a massive undertaking, he initially suggested that one option would be for the federal government to pay for it and, essentially, rent it out to the telecom companies. But he had scrapped that idea. A later draft, he said, proposed that the major telecom companies—Verizon, A.T. & T., Sprint, and T-Mobile—form a separate company to build the network together and share it. “It was meant to be a nationwide network,” Spalding told me, not a nationalized one. “They could build this network and then sell bandwidth to their retail customers. That was one idea, but it was never that the government would own the network. It was always about, How do we get industry to actually secure the system?”
Even before Spalding began working on his report, the telecom companies were rolling out what they were calling their new 5G services in test markets around the country. In 2017, Verizon announced that it would be introducing 5G in eleven municipalities, including Dallas, Ann Arbor, Miami, and Denver. A.T. & T. was testing its service in a dozen cities. T-Mobile was concentrating on Spokane. For the most part, they were building their new services on top of existing infrastructure—and inheriting its vulnerabilities. As the Clemson University professor Thomas Hazlett told me, “This is just the transitional part. You have various experiments, you do trial in the market, and various deployments take place that lay a pathway to something that will be truly distinguishable from the old systems.”
In the meantime, the carriers jockeyed for position. A lawsuit brought by Sprint and T-Mobile, which was settled on Monday, claimed that A.T. & T.’s 5GE service, where “E” stands for “evolution,” was just 4G by another name. According to Spalding, when the carriers heard that the government was considering “nationalizing” the future of their industry, they quickly mobilized against it. “As I’ve talked to people subsequently, they said they’ve never seen that industry unite so quickly,” Spalding said. “They have such support in government and on the Hill and in the bureaucracy, and they have such a huge lobbying contingent, that it was across the board and swift.” The Axios story came out on a Sunday. The following day, Ajit Pai, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, roundly rejected any idea of federalizing the Internet, saying that “the market, not government, is best positioned to drive innovation and investment.” By Wednesday, Spalding was out of a job. “There was no ‘Hey, thank you for your service,’ ” Spalding told me. “It was just ‘Get out. Don’t let the door hit your butt.’ ”
Huawei, a Chinese manufacturer of consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment, is currently the global leader in 5G technology. Founded, in the eighties, by Ren Zhengfei, an engineer who began his career in the People’s Liberation Army, Huawei has been accused by cybersecurity experts and politicians, most notably Donald Trump, of being a conduit to Chinese intelligence. In an op-ed in the Washington Post, the Republican senators Tom Cotton, of Arkansas, and John Cornyn, of Texas, characterized the company, which is funded with subsidies from the Chinese government, as a Trojan horse that could “give China effective control of the digital commanding heights.” They tell the story of the African Union, which installed Huawei servers in its headquarters, in Addis Ababa, only to discover that those servers had been sending sensitive data back to China every evening. Although Huawei vigorously denies that it is an agent of the Chinese government, the senators pointed out, the company is subject to a Chinese law that requires companies to coöperate with the state intelligence apparatus. The Times of London reported that the C.I.A. has evidence that Huawei has taken money from the P.L.A., as well as from branches of the Chinese intelligence service. Australia, Japan, and New Zealand have joined with the United States in banning Huawei hardware from their networks.
So far, though, the Trump Administration’s campaign to shut out Huawei is finding limited traction. The European Union is poised to reject American entreaties, with individual countries like Portugal and Germany expressing a willingness to use Huawei equipment. Canada is relying on Huawei for at least one 5G trial. Even A.T. & T., which is bound by the federal guidelines that will go into effect next year in the U.S., continues to use Huawei equipment in Mexico, where it is the third-largest wireless company. Huawei equipment is cheaper than its Western rivals and, in the estimation of researchers at the Defensive Innovation Board (DIB), which advises the Secretary of Defense on new technologies, in many cases, it is superior. By the start of this year, Huawei had cornered nearly thirty per cent of the global telecommunications-equipment market, and its revenue was thirty-nine-per-cent higher than the year before. According to the DIB, its continued growth “will allow China to promote its preferred standards and specifications for 5G networks and will shape the global 5G product market going forward.”
There are very good reasons to keep a company that appears to be beholden to a government with a documented history of industrial cyber espionage, international data theft, and domestic spying out of global digital networks. But banning Huawei hardware will not secure those networks. Even in the absence of Huawei equipment, systems still may rely on software developed in China, and software can be reprogrammed remotely by malicious actors. And every device connected to the fifth-generation Internet will likely remain susceptible to hacking. According to James Baker, the former F.B.I. general counsel who runs the national-security program at the R Street Institute, “There’s a concern that those devices that are connected to the 5G network are not going to be very secure from a cyber perspective. That presents a huge vulnerability for the system, because those devices can be turned into bots, for example, and you can have a massive botnet that can be used to attack different parts of the network.”
This past January, Tom Wheeler, who was the F.C.C. chairman during the Obama Administration, published an Op-Ed in the New York Times titled “If 5G Is So Important, Why Isn’t It Secure?” The Trump Administration had walked away from security efforts begun during Wheeler’s tenure at the F.C.C.; most notably, in recent negotiations over international standards, the U.S. eliminated a requirement that the technical specifications of 5G include cyber defense. “For the first time in history,” Wheeler wrote, “cybersecurity was being required as a forethought in the design of a new network standard—until the Trump F.C.C. repealed it.” The agency also rejected the notion that companies building and running American digital networks were responsible for overseeing their security. This might have been expected, but the current F.C.C. does not consider cybersecurity to be a part of its domain, either. “I certainly did when we were in office,” Wheeler told me. “But the Republicans who were on the commission at that point in time, and are still there, one being the chairman, opposed those activities as being overly regulatory.”
The Trump Administration, keen to win what it has characterized as “the race to 5G,” may be more interested in attempting to put a brake on Huawei’s—and, by extension, China’s—progress. In January, the company’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, a daughter of the Huawei founder, was indicted on thirteen counts in the U.S., including breaking sanctions against Iran, money laundering, and obstruction of justice. Meng is currently under arrest in Canada and fighting extradition. Ajit Pai, the F.C.C. chairman, recently announced that the commission will block another Chinese company, China Mobile, from operating in the U.S., again citing security concerns. “If we didn’t have these other trade issues with China, it would be easier to just accept the [Administration’s] security statements as truth,” Scott Wallsten, an economist and the president of the Technology Policy Institute, told me. “But when it gets mixed up with all these other trade issues, it makes it a little more suspect.”
In October, Trump signed a memorandum on “Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for America’s Future.” A few weeks later, the F.C.C. auctioned off new swaths of the electromagnetic radio spectrum. (There was another auction last month, with more scheduled for later this year.) Opening up new spectrum is crucial to achieving the super-fast speeds promised by 5G. Most American carriers are planning to migrate their services to a higher part of the spectrum, where the bands are big and broad and allow for colossal rivers of data to flow through them. (Some carriers are also working with lower-spectrum frequencies, where the speeds will not be as fast but likely more reliable.) Until recently, these high-frequency bands, which are called millimetre waves, were not available for Internet transmission, but advances in antenna technology have made it possible, at least in theory. In practice, millimetre waves are finicky: they can only travel short distances—about a thousand feet—and are impeded by walls, foliage, human bodies, and, apparently, rain.
To accommodate these limitations, 5G cellular relays will have to be installed inside buildings and on every city block, at least. Cell relays mounted on thirteen million utility poles, for example, will deliver 5G speeds to just over half of the American population, and cost around four hundred billion dollars to install. Rural communities will be out of luck—too many trees, too few people—despite the F.C.C.’s recently announced Rural Digital Opportunity Fund. According to Blair Levin, a communications analyst and former F.C.C. chief of staff in the Clinton Administration, the fund “has nothing to do with 5G.” Rather, it will subsidize companies to lay fibre-optic cable that, minimally, will provide speeds forty times slower than what 5G promises.
Deploying millions of wireless relays so close to one another and, therefore, to our bodies has elicited its own concerns. Two years ago, a hundred and eighty scientists and doctors from thirty-six countries appealed to the European Union for a moratorium on 5G adoption until the effects of the expected increase in low-level radiation were studied. In February, Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut, took both the F.C.C. and F.D.A. to task for pushing ahead with 5G without assessing its health risks. “We’re kind of flying blind here,” he concluded. A system built on millions of cell relays, antennas, and sensors also offers previously unthinkable surveillance potential. Telecom companies already sell location data to marketers, and law enforcement has used similar data to track protesters. 5G will catalogue exactly where someone has come from, where they are going, and what they are doing. “To give one made-up example,” Steve Bellovin, a computer-science professor at Columbia University, told the Wall Street Journal, “might a pollution sensor detect cigarette smoke or vaping, while a Bluetooth receiver picks up the identities of nearby phones? Insurance companies might be interested.” Paired with facial recognition and artificial intelligence, the data streams and location capabilities of 5G will make anonymity a historical artifact.
In China, which has installed three hundred and fifty thousand 5G relays—about ten times more than the United States—enhanced geolocation, coupled with an expansive network of surveillance cameras, each equipped with facial-recognition technology, has enabled authorities to track and subordinate the country’s eleven million Uighur Muslims. According to the Times, “the practice makes China a pioneer in applying next-generation technology to watch its people, potentially ushering in a new era of automated racism.”
The United States is not there yet, and may never be. But, as 5G begins to be rolled out, the pressure to capture and capitalize on new streams of data from individuals, businesses, and government will only grow more intense. Building safeguards into the system seems like an obvious and necessary goal. Spalding is now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and also advises corporations and other agencies on the cybersecurity threats posed by China. But, he warns, the danger is not limited to a single nation-state. “What is existential to democracy is allowing totalitarian regimes—or any government—full knowledge of everything you do at all times,” he said. “Because the tendency is always going to be to want to regulate how you think, how you act, what you do. The problem is that most people don’t think very hard about what that world would look like.”
A previous version of this post misidentified one of the Chinese companies blocked from operating in the U.S.

Kalergi plan


Kalergia Pan-European Plan for Europe. In the 1920s, Freemason (In 1922, Kalergi became a member of the Masonic lodge "Humanitas"), Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote a book entitled "Praktischer Idealismus " (practical idealism), which set forth his views on how he believed the abolition of the right to self-determination and liquidation of European countries should be carried out with the formation of the European Union.
After the publication of the book, Kalergi received help from the baron of millionaire Louis Nathaniel de Rothschild, who linked him to one of his friends, the banker Max Warburg. Warburg financed Kalergi to help form his European movement. Kalergi urged not only the destruction of European states, but also the deliberate genocide of indigenous peoples through forced mass migration to create a homogeneous mass.
The Kalergi in his own words:
"(European) man of the future will be mixed races. Today's races and classes will disappear due to the disappearance of space (nations) and time."
The Pan-European plan of Kalergi envisaged the use of violent and disproportionate mass immigration, especially from non-European countries, in order to bring about a common European state dictatorship and the destruction of the indigenous white population - the nationalities of Europe.
Intentional and violent immigration in any country in order to colonize and destroy is one of the most extreme racist doctrines
They say that the supporter of the plan of Kallergi is Soros and the Rothschild family. By the way, in the European Union there is a special Charlemagne Prize and the first one awarded is Kallergi.
In his works, Kudenhove-Kalergi showed that if there are no nations, then there will be no borders - therefore a single community will be created.
Brock Chisholm, first Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), told the USA Magazine on August 12, 1955: "The priority of European countries should be the control of fertility and the promotion of the ideal of interracial unions in order to create a single race in a single world [one unipolar] subordinate to centralized power" .
In "Practical Idealism" the main inspirer of modern united Europe has directly written that in the future Europe will be ruled by a spiritual elite, the core of which will be the German aristocracy and the Jews. At the same time, the leading role will remain for the Jews, whom he calls "the leading spiritual race of Europe," "the nobility of the brain," and "the spiritual aristocracy."
As for the rest of the population of Europe, in the future it will, according to Kalerga, become a homogeneous Eurasian-Negroid race, and the nations will disappear, mix with each other and - very importantly - with a LARGE number of MIGRANTS.
Today, the ideas of Kudenhove-Kalergia are successfully implemented. Before our eyes, the demographic revolution is taking place (the reduction in the number of Europeans replaced by the "Eurasian-Negroid race"), the "spiritual nation of leaders" is consolidating , the process of "denationalizing" Europe is rapidly proceeding through the abolition of political boundaries.

Friday 3 May 2019

Saul Alinsky’s 12 Rules for Radicals…

Saul Alinsky’s 12 Rules for Radicals…

Here is the complete list from Alinsky.


RULE 1: “Power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have.”
Power is derived from 2 main sources – money and people. “Have-Nots” must build power from flesh and blood. (These are two things of which there is a plentiful supply. Government and corporations always have a difficult time appealing to people, and usually do so almost exclusively with economic arguments.)

RULE 2: “Never go outside the expertise of your people.”
It results in confusion, fear and retreat. Feeling secure adds to the backbone of anyone. (Organizations under attack wonder why radicals don’t address the “real” issues. This is why. They avoid things with which they have no knowledge.)

RULE 3: “Whenever possible, go outside the expertise of the enemy.”
Look for ways to increase insecurity, anxiety and uncertainty. (This happens all the time. Watch how many organizations under attack are blind-sided by seemingly irrelevant arguments that they are then forced to address.)

RULE 4: “Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules.”
If the rule is that every letter gets a reply, send 30,000 letters. You can kill them with this because no one can possibly obey all of their own rules. (This is a serious rule. The besieged entity’s very credibility and reputation is at stake, because if activists catch it lying or not living up to its commitments, they can continue to chip away at the damage.)

RULE 5: “Ridicule is man’s most potent weapon.”
There is no defense. It’s irrational. It’s infuriating. It also works as a key pressure point to force the enemy into concessions. (Pretty crude, rude and mean, huh? They want to create anger and fear.)

RULE 6: “A good tactic is one your people enjoy.”
They’ll keep doing it without urging and come back to do more. They’re doing their thing, and will even suggest better ones. (Radical activists, in this sense, are no different that any other human being. We all avoid “un-fun” activities, and but we revel at and enjoy the ones that work and bring results.)

RULE 7: “A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag.”
Don’t become old news. (Even radical activists get bored. So to keep them excited and involved, organizers are constantly coming up with new tactics.)

RULE 8: “Keep the pressure on. Never let up.”
Keep trying new things to keep the opposition off balance. As the opposition masters one approach, hit them from the flank with something new. (Attack, attack, attack from all sides, never giving the reeling organization a chance to rest, regroup, recover and re-strategize.)

RULE 9: “The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself.”
Imagination and ego can dream up many more consequences than any activist. (Perception is reality. Large organizations always prepare a worst-case scenario, something that may be furthest from the activists’ minds. The upshot is that the organization will expend enormous time and energy, creating in its own collective mind the direst of conclusions. The possibilities can easily poison the mind and result in demoralization.)

RULE 10: “If you push a negative hard enough, it will push through and become a positive.”
Violence from the other side can win the public to your side because the public sympathizes with the underdog. (Unions used this tactic. Peaceful [albeit loud] demonstrations during the heyday of unions in the early to mid-20th Century incurred management’s wrath, often in the form of violence that eventually brought public sympathy to their side.)

RULE 11: “The price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative.”
Never let the enemy score points because you’re caught without a solution to the problem. (Old saw: If you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of the problem. Activist organizations have an agenda, and their strategy is to hold a place at the table, to be given a forum to wield their power. So, they have to have a compromise solution.)

RULE 12: Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.”
Cut off the support network and isolate the target from sympathy. Go after people and not institutions; people hurt faster than institutions. (This is cruel, but very effective. Direct, personalized criticism and ridicule works.)